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Facilitating the Italian Mafia:  
The grey zone of complicity and collusion 
Felia Allum, Rossella Merlino and Alessandro Colletti 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite structural and operational differences, Italian mafias share an ability to expand and infiltrate global 
economies whilst remaining rooted within their local territory. They are not only the product of specific socio-
economic and political conditions but also of the extensive complicity on which they can count. It is this fertile 
‘grey zone’ of mafia relations with accomplices identified as enablers, facilitators, sponsors and helpers that 
is analysed here. Engaging with the existing literature and using a range of new judicial sources, including 
evidence from mafia trials, this article develops in-depth case studies to identify and examine the hidden 
face of Italian mafias. 
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Despite its historical ties with Sicily, the term ‘mafia(s)’ is generally used to define all the different 
criminal organisations originating from the South of Italy. The Sicilian mafia Cosa Nostra, the 
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra differ greatly from each other in terms of their 
organisational model and their diverse patterns of evolution (Catino 2014). Cosa Nostra, with its 
hierarchical structure, cultural and economic dimension, and its political and international reach was 
long viewed as the most powerful of Italian mafias. However, since the 1990s Cosa Nostra has 
undergone a critical phase of transition following internal conflicts, loss of external legitimisation and, 
above all, intensification of law enforcement repression (Paoli 2008, p.15). This does not mean that 
the Sicilian mafia has been defeated. Rather, it has resulted in changes within the organisation at a 
structural and operational level aimed at facilitating infiltration in legal and illegal economic sectors, 
and public administrations (DIA 1, p. 6). The Calabria ‘Ndrangheta is located in Calabria and abroad 
(especially, Canada and Australia). It is today considered the most powerful mafia because of its 
predominant role in cocaine trafficking into Europe. Lastly, the Neapolitan Camorra is active in 
Campania and abroad. At home, it manages to be involved in many different illegal activities 
(extortion, drug trafficking, waste management, counterfeit goods) and abroad it seeks to recycle its 
profits into the legal economy. Locally, it also manages to infiltrate the local economy and politics to 
control many public contracts and new building projects1.  
Yet, all three groups share traits that are unique to mafia-type phenomena, and which distinguish 
them from other forms of criminality both inside and outside Italy.  
Throughout their history, Italian mafias have consistently demonstrated an ability to link tradition 
to innovation tightly. They can adapt structure and modus operandi to the changing social, economic 
and political environment, realign themselves in negotiations with global markets, and 
simultaneously maintain a strong collective identity based on traditional cultural codes and practices 
that they share with external society. To a different degree, they are simultaneously local and global, 
what has been labelled ‘glocal’ (Hobbs 1998). As a result, in spite of increasingly tougher Italian anti-
mafia legislation and punitive measures, mafias today continue to expand and to benefit from 
growing opportunities brought about by globalisation while remaining substantially rooted within the 
local territory they control (Allum 2014). Mafias manage to do this partly through their use of violence, 
intimidation, omertà (law of silence) and money, but more importantly, through their use and 
manipulation of mutually advantageous relationships with external, legitimate actors (Allum 2016). 
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The so-called invisible ‘accomplices’, ‘enablers’, ‘sponsors’, or ‘facilitators’ represent ‘an 
essential aspect of the mafia phenomenon, without which many of the activities, illegal and legal […] 
would not be possible and mafia groups would thus be reduced to purely criminal behaviour’ (Santino 
2006, pp. 251-252). In Italian, the space within which relations of collusion and complicity, common 
interests and mutual exchanges between criminal groups and external actors take place is referred 
to as l‘area grigia, ‘the “grey zone” that divides the good and the bad’ (Sciarrone 2014, p. 21). It 
represents a highly permeable and flexible zone where boundaries between the legal and the illegal 
world, between lawful and unlawful markets are blurred (Mete & Sciarrone 2017, p. 294). As has 
been observed, 
 
legal and illegal activities do not operate on parallel and distinct levels, but rather they are connected and 
interdependent. Following this reasoning, the next step is to acknowledge that there is a point where two 
businesses, legal and illegal, necessarily meet. This point is profit, which is the main driver of the activities 
of both (Vander Beken & Van Daele 2008, p. 740). 
 
This ‘grey zone’ is inhabited by professionals from the public and private sectors such as 
businessmen, lawyers, notaries, engineers, architects, doctors and even people in positions of 
responsibility such as judges, politicians, law enforcement officers, public sector managers, 
accountants and solicitors and it is their invisible but vital relationship with mafia organisations that 
we analyse in this article. Specifically, this article seeks to examine how Italian mafias survive and 
flourish through mainstream channels, through non-criminal individuals, contacts and environments. 
First, it presents an overview of how these mainstream channels have been defined and 
conceptualised in theoretical terms, with a specific focus on differences existing between the Anglo-
Saxon and Italian literature. Secondly, we apply these theoretical tools to our three selected cases 
studies to highlight the behaviour of Italian mafias as well as the way they communicate and engage 
with their mainstream interlocutors within specific contexts. Lastly, we conclude that it be helpful to 
conceptualising the grey-zone not merely in terms of specific economic and financial skills but as a 
large, extensive and flexible group of people with multiple skills and contacts who perpetually engage 
with criminals how and when necessary. At the same time, we reflect on the value of exploring this 
phenomenon in its complexity, reach and depth by rooting existing conceptual frameworks in 
empirical data and by moving away from narrow and limiting definitions. 
The data used in this article are mainly derived from judicial and parliamentary sources. 
Italian judicial sources in the form of publicly available precautionary injunctions (‘ordinanza 
cautelare’) and final sentences of mafia bosses and clans are of particular interest because they 
provide a significant amount of sociological detail that can allow us to re-construct the nature of 
different mafia relationships, groups, associations and events. The richness of the detail presented 
in Italian judicial documents is rarely found in other judicial systems which explains why they 
represent such an invaluable data source. However, in writing this article, we were aware of the 
possible risk of over-reliance on judicial records, which are traditionally selected and ordered 
according to their normative value (Paoli 2003). For this reason and for the purposes of triangulation 
of data, judicial sentences has been accompanied, where possible, by parliamentary and scholarly 
reconstruction of events in order to provide a more exhaustive version of the events described. 
To be clear, this article does not seek to provide a comprehensive overview of the Italian 
‘grey zone’, which, being as multifaceted and heterogeneous as it is, makes the task almost an 
impossible one. Rather, by looking at specific concrete examples, it offers a practical application of 
a well-defined analytical model that can be applied to other case studies beyond Italy. Examining 
the specific dynamics through which these networks are established and maintained may contribute 
to understanding mafias’ ability to flourish through mainstream channels, despite existing internal 
fractures and increasing external pressure from law enforcement agencies.  
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‘Enablers’, ‘sponsors’ and ‘facilitators’ inhabit the ‘grey zone 
In the literature on organised crime, ‘one aspect that is neglected [...] is the role that facilitators 
play within and between criminal networks‘ (Levi, Nelen & Lankhorst 2004, p. 117). One potential 
reason behind this is the difficulty for law enforcement agencies to pin point, analyse and track the 
roles, tasks and responsibilities of these different actors; a challenge that is also posed to 
researchers. What becomes evident is that there exists a clear difference in the conceptualisation of 
these actors in the Anglo-Saxon and Italian literature. This is due to their different definitions and 
understanding of criminal organisations.  
Since it was first coined in the US over a century ago, the concept of ‘organised crime’ has 
shifted systematically between two notions: ‘(1) the provision of illegal goods and services; (2) a 
criminal organisation, understood as a large-scale entity primarily engaged in illegal activities’ (Paoli 
& Vander Beken 2014, p. 22). In general, since the 1950s, the main definition for organised crime 
within the American and European scientific and policy making communities (excluding Italy) has 
been that of organised crime as ‘enterprise crime’. This is a term that draws attention to the 
production and distribution of illegal goods and services, activities that require considerable skills in 
planning and organisation as well as extended networks of participants” (Kirby & Penna 2010, p. 
195). In Italy, on the other hand, since mafia association was defined legally in the early 1980s the 
definition of ‘organised crime’ was not purely as a business process but as a wider social, economic 
and political phenomenon. The legal definition of mafia-type association given in the Article 416-bis 
of the Criminal Code prescribes that: 
 
A Mafia-type organisation is an association whose members use the power of intimidation deriving from the 
bonds of membership, and the resulting condition of coercion and silence that it engenders to commit 
offences, to acquire direct or indirect control of economic activities, licences, authorisations, public 
procurement contracts and services or to obtain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or others, or to 
prevent or obstruct the free exercise of voting rights, or to procure votes for themselves or others at elections 
(Art. 416-bis Cc). 
 
Armao argues that ‘it might be useful [...] to define organised crime as a genus, including many 
different species depending on the geopolitical and historical context’ (2003, p. 28). Cosa Nostra, 
the ‘Ndrangheta and the Camorra are all types of mafias, which are defined not merely as ‘an industry 
of private protection‘ (Gambetta 1993, p. 1) but rather as a combination of both secret society and 
efficient business (Sciarrone 1998). From this perspective, mafia is not just an economic business 
enterprise, but also an association that seeks to dominate civil society, control the economic 
activities, and infiltrate the political institutions in their territory of origin. 
The cultural and political dimension of its inner dynamics and social relations therefore is 
crucial for the mafia, but not necessarily for other forms of organised crime (Santoro 2011, p. 3). In 
this way, mafias present a unique ability to use social capital - that is their ability to weave relations 
with political, administrative and entrepreneurial actors from their external environment. The 
difference in approach can be seen also in the terms used to describe these so-called helpers. In 
mainstream approaches, it is what helpers do that identifies them. Terms such as ‘enablers‘ and 
‘facilitators’ are often used to describe those middle class professionals who provide criminals with 
assistance, complicity and support; it is their ‘dishonesty’, their ‘serious misconduct’ and their 
‘culpable involvement’ that defines them, not in terms of society but in terms of their specific technical 
skills and financial and legal knowledge. This is what Middleton and Levi define as ‘professional 
capital’: ‘a sub set of social capital that makes use of occupational prestige rankings’ (2004, p.130). 
A clear example of this can be seen in the English NCA‘s 2016 Strategic Assessment of 
Serious and Organised crime, which defines ‘enablers’ and their skills in the following terms: 
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The skills and knowledge of a variety of professionals, such as accountancy service providers (ASP), the 
legal profession, estate agents, and trust and company service providers (TCSP), are used by OCGs for 
sometimes complex money laundering activity. They assist, wittingly or unwittingly, in creating complexity 
through actions such as setting up networks of corporate structures, acquiring assets to store illicit funds 
and providing anonymity for the criminal. Their involvement very likely gives transactions an appearance of 
respectability (p. 29). 
 
Middleton and Levi (2004) developed a typology of different forms of assistance from lawyers 
and distinguished between ‘necessary wrong doing’ and ‘simply desirable wrongdoing’. These 
ranged from basic provisions of practical help to more sophisticated forms of assistance, to more 
highly sophisticated forms based on professional advice. Nelen and Lankhorst (2008) on the other 
hand, focused on ‘the risks that [Dutch] lawyers and notaries run, deliberately or not, in collaborating 
with unlawful practices’ (p. 163). They define this collaboration in terms of ‘culpable involvement’, 
either when a professional is criminally involved in an act (and can become an accessory) or when 
a professional ‘fails to exercise due care in preventing abuse of his/her professional services for 
criminal purposes’ (p. 164). Middleton and Levi concluded that there was evidence of serious 
wrongdoing by solicitors and other law specialists and that ‘what is, inevitably unknown, is the extent 
of this behaviour, which is not detected at any particular moment in time, and that which is never 
detected at all’ (2004, p. 147). 
The Anglo-Saxon literature therefore concentrates chiefly on the role of financial and legal 
service providers ‘such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, tax consultants, tax specialists and real 
estate agents [...]’ (Levi, Nelen & Lankhorst, 2004, p. 117), where Italian literature uses a wider and 
more holistic approach. In Italian, these actors are identified by the physical environment they 
occupy. They inhabit ‘the grey zone’: if the legal world is seen as white and pure and the illicit 
underworld as black, the space and borders between these two worlds become ‘grey’, ‘blurred’, 
‘unclear’, ‘confused’ ‘fussy’ and ‘cloudy’ (Sciarrone 2011, p. 11). 
This is not a recent phenomenon. Already in post-Unification Italy, the Tuscan senator 
Leopoldo Franchetti noted in his 1876 Inchiesta in Sicilia (‘Inquest on Sicily’) that ‘it is not uncommon 
to hear of an influential politician or someone who works in local administration who has a mafia 
boss or other middle-class thugs from Palermo or the nearby areas at his own service’ (p. 12). 
Indeed, links between criminal organisations and external political and economic actors appear to 
be a constant in the history of Italian mafias (Lupo 1993; Ciconte 1992; Barbagallo 2010). Umberto 
Santino called this ‘borghesia mafiosa’ (‘middle class mafia’), and noted that ‘the system of relations 
with the social world [...] is an essential aspect of the mafia phenomenon, without which many of the 
activities, illegal and legal [...] would not be possible and mafia groups would thus be reduced to 
purely a criminal behaviour’ (2006, 251-252). Similarly, De Gennaro and Pizzuti defined ‘borghesia 
camorrista’ the intertwinement of collusion, cooperation and exchanges of Camorra groups with 
members of the local middle class (2009, 62-63).  
According to the definition given by the Italian Antimafia Directorate (DIA), the ‘grey zone’ 
comprises ‘representatives from the political class, institutions, professional, business world (with 
Masonic links) that provide organised crime and in particular, mafia dynasties, opportunities to 
increase profits and, at times, guarantee impunity‘ (2010, p. 93). The grey zone is therefore a space 
that extends between the licit and the illicit, in which mutually advantageous relations take place 
between mafiosi, entrepreneurs, politicians, members of the liberal professions and civil servants 
(Sciarrone 2011, p. 41). It is not an area situated outside the mafia, but a space within which mafiosi 
themselves seek and establish alliances, exchange favours and engage with external actors, offering 
them different services of protection and intermediation (Sciarrone and Storti 2016). In this sense, 
‘the grey area does not represent the extension of the illegal into the legal sphere, but a combination 
of both, an area of porous, opaque and flexible boundaries’ (CPI1, p. 23).  
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Sciarrone (2011, pp. 35-67) defines these relations as ‘complicit’, ‘collusive’, or ‘penetrative’ 
(see Table 1), with these definitions denoting different levels of collaboration. In particular, he 
identifies the types of networks involved, the natures of the relationships, and how professionals of 
the ‘grey zone’ envisage this relationship. By ‘complicity’ he means a one-off specific economic 
exchange between a rational individual and a clan. By ‘collusion’, he means where an individual 
agrees upon a collective, criminal business project with the clan; this becomes a continuous 
exchange (in the form or a frontname or a real company). And lastly, by ‘co-penetration, he means 
where an individual develops a sense of belonging and identifies with the clan’s criminal project (s/he 
behaves and is a member).  
 
Table 1: Sciarrone’s model of analysis of relations with ‘grey zone’ 
 
Type of relationship Rationale Nature of relationship 
Complicity Instrumental Temporary/one off economic exchange 
Collusion Co-participation Permanent common business deals 
Co-penetration Belonging Organic relations, members to all effects 
Source: Sciarrone (2011, p. 36) 
 
Such an approach goes beyond the Anglo-Saxon understanding of ‘helpers’ in terms of pure 
legal and financial help, to embrace a wider notion of help in all possible forms, which can encompass 
many different types of behaviour. In particular, this approach highlights the human interaction 
dynamics of how relationships between different players develop: from strong ties that bound mafia 
members to each other, to weaker ties mafiosi establish with external social groups (Granovetter 
1973; Sciarrone and Storti 2014). Furthermore, the degree of cohesion in organisational 
relationships between the network’s members varies significantly from group to group, ‘thus enabling 
parts of the organisation to have more independence’ (Sciarrone and Storti 2014, p. 6). 
Informed by Sciarrone’s approach, the following case studies2 investigate three distinct 
examples of grey zones active around Cosa Nostra, the ‘Ndrangheta and the Camorra. In this sense, 
the aim of this article is not to propose a new theoretical framework about grey zones but to challenge 
the narrow existing concept of purely financial-legal enablers so as to permit a broader 
understanding of the different dynamics and interaction between mafiosi and other professional 
bodies. 
The advantage of adopting an empirical case study approach is that it facilitates data analysis 
without isolating the phenomenon being studied from its background, and without limiting the array 
of interacting variables. Case study analysis is indeed a particularly useful method in this context as 
it represents ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin 1984, p. 23). Furthermore, the informed use of a 
theoretical framework ‘as a guide to empirical research’ in interpretive case study represents a useful 
method of utilising the interlinked concepts in the theory to provide insights in contexts other than 
that in which they are developed (Walsham 1993, 71). In this sense, the sociological categories 
outlined by Sciarrone (2011) provide us with a helpful conceptual framework to undertake a micro-
level analysis and illustrate the varied nature of those who comprise the grey zone, how they interact 
with the mafias, and how they exploit each other.  
 
Collusion: Cosa Nostra, doctors and police officers 
Our first example is from the Sicilian mafia, Cosa Nostra, and illustrates the extensive nature 
of its grey zone. In particular, it shows the mafia’s ability to infiltrate a profitable legal business 
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through an established system of complicity and collusion by high profile external actors from the 
public administration, the political, judicial and business sector.  
In the 1970s, Cosa Nostra witnessed the accession to power of the Corleonese faction led 
by Luciano Leggio first, and Salvatore Riina and Bernardo Provenzano later; their long-term strategy 
was to establish their total control over the organisation across Sicily by means of integrating political 
connections and the use of systematic and ruthless violence. This culminated in the early 1980s in 
the ‘second mafia war’ against rival mafia factions; this was the bloodiest conflict ever to take place 
in mafia history. The Mafiosi on the losing side, who had survived the extermination project by the 
Corleonese faction, were given the possibility to collaborate with the Italian judicial system in return 
for reduced sentences as well as protection from possible revenge from the Corleonese coalition. 
Ultimately, their testimonies provided the grounds for the maxi-trial in Palermo (1986-1987), whose 
central contentions would be upheld by the Court of Cassation in 1992. Cosa Nostra retaliated 
immediately by launching a bombing campaign against prominent anti-mafia figures including judges 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino.  
As a result, by the mid-1990s the Sicilian mafia was damaged by years of internecine 
contrasts and by the unforeseen consequences of its attack on the state, which undermined its 
relations with wider society. Furthermore, the state’s response to the attacks of the Corleonese 
faction had exceeded mafia expectations: the increased severity of pre-trial custody, restrictive 
prison regimes, the confiscation of goods, and new laws on money laundering and pentiti (state 
witnesses) had a devastating impact on the organisation, both economically and structurally (TP1, 
p. 154). Therefore, when the boss Bernardo Provenzano assumed control of the organisation in the 
mid-1990s, he opted for a strategy that aimed to bring the organisation back into contact with public 
institutions, to regain the social consensus lost after the bombing campaign, and eventually to regain 
control over territory, whilst remaining under the radar (Merlino 2012). 
State witness Antonino Giuffrè, a former ally of Provenzano, revealed to investigating 
magistrates that Provenzano’s ‘strategy of submersion’ was based on creating a centrally directed 
network of internal and external relations between trusted collaborators and intermediaries (TTI1, p. 
10). One of these networks was based around Palermo’s private healthcare system. It involved 
prominent mafiosi, but also a vast and varied professional group made up of high-profile doctors, 
government officers, entrepreneurs, and members of law enforcement agencies, including among 
many others: 
• Michele Aiello, a construction industry entrepreneur turned private health magnate in the 
1990s. 
• Domenico Miceli, a surgeon and Palermo’s public health councillor. 
• Giuseppe Ciuro, officer of the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (Antimafia Investigation 
Directorate). 
• Giorgio Riolo, officer of the Carabinieri, and an expert in planting bugging devices. 
• Giuseppe Guttadauro, a prominent surgeon and mafia boss of the Brancaccio faction3.  
This enabler network of ‘shadow alliances’ was exposed by two separate yet interconnected 
judicial operations, namely ‘Ghiaccio 2’ (CPI2 2006, p. 259) and ‘Talpe alla DDA’ (lit. ‘moles’, police 
spies in the Antimafia Investigation Directorate, PP1)4. The first investigation was brought against 
Domenico Miceli and others, accused for the crime of mafia association and external support to the 
mafia organisation (concorso esterno). In particular, it examined the relationship between Miceli and 
prominent mafia and political figures, as well as the role that mafia boss Guttadauro played in Miceli’s 
candidacy in the 2001 regional elections (CPI2, p. 259). When Guttadauro and other mafia members 
from the Bagheria area discovered a series of bugging devices in their own houses, the hypothesis 
that secret judicial information had been leaked became the grounds for a second investigation. 
Thus, the inquiry set up to investigate Guttadauro’s relationship with Miceli and the Palermitan 
political elite became intertwined with a parallel inquiry into the ‘moles at the DDA’, which would 
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expose the central role of the ‘engineer’ Michele Aiello as the mastermind behind the intricate 
healthcare fraud discussed in this case study (CPI2, p. 258-260). 
It was the pentito Antonino Giuffrè who first provided magistrates with important insights into 
Aiello’s alleged role as Provenzano’s frontman. By then, Aiello had already established two 
diagnostic and radiotherapy clinics in the district of Bagheria, both at the forefront of technology for 
the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. Aiello, who owned the Villa Santa Teresa, a clinic specialising 
in cancer diagnostics, radiotherapy, and nuclear medicine, was accused of laundering money for 
Cosa Nostra and exploiting his relationships with the business, criminal, and law-enforcement 
sectors to ensure his immunity and to pursue his own lucrative activities in Sicily’s healthcare and 
construction industries (TdP2, p. 5-8)5. 
In terms of Sciarrone’s conceptual model on the ‘grey zone’, Aiello’s relationship with Cosa 
Nostra can be defined as one of ‘collusion’. He was an entrepreneur who established a mutual, 
stable, and on-going relationship with the leadership of Cosa Nostra, through which he was able to 
pursue and expand his business. The mafia guaranteed protection, winning of public contracts, 
funding resources, privilege over competitors in return for infiltration into legal markets, capital 
investment, hiring labour, and use of selected suppliers (CPI2, p. 201). It is evident that Aiello does 
not represent the typical entrepreneur who is a victim of mafia extortion, but a ‘client entrepreneur’ 
who has built a loyal relationship with Cosa Nostra on a personal level. As Sciarrone argued, ‘when 
this happens, the reciprocal interaction is accompanied by a process of identification: the 
entrepreneur shares the values and intentions of the mafia members and it is this connection that 
pushes them into collusion’ (2010, p. 189). 
Previously involved in the rural road construction business, Aiello’s fortune rose when he 
entered the private healthcare sector, one of the most profitable in Sicily, and a sector in which 
Provenzano had already extended mafia influence since the 1980s6. The healthcare system, linked 
as it is with important political and economic control centres, was a good choice of target, as it offered 
a large potential for profit. 
The profitability of private clinics depends on accreditation and on the inclusion of medical 
procedures and prices in the list of billable services, factors that are in the hands of the regional 
government. Aiello’s contacts with the public health councillor, Miceli, and with political figures close 
to the Sicilian Governor, Salvatore Cuffaro, enabled him to set and fix the prices of the clinic’s 
services for state’s repayment (TdP2, pp. 1220-1224). As a result, a vast amount of public money 
was illegally directed towards Aiello’s business. According to Giuffrè, Aiello had built his empire by 
laundering mafia money, and was now repaying large sums into the Bagheria mafia faction7. 
Following Giuffrè’s revelations, the Carabinieri Special Operations Group (ROS) decided to plant 
bugs in Aiello’s clinic, and this task was assigned to the inconspicuous Giorgio Riolo. In the 
meantime, Giuseppe Ciuro, who worked with Anti-mafia public prosecutor Antonio Ingroia, and had 
access to highly sensitive information regarding mafia investigations, also leaked secret information 
to Aiello and kept him up-to-date with developments in his case (PP1, pp. 6-7). 
Based on Sciarrone’s model of analysis, both Riolo and Ciuro’s roles within the ‘grey zone’ 
examined in this case study are those of ‘complicity’, as their relationship with Cosa Nostra was 
essentially goal-oriented and temporary. By offering their skills and their access to classified 
information, they enabled and facilitated Cosa Nostra’s activities without being formally affiliated to 
the organisation. They had been close to Aiello for years, providing him with classified police and 
judicial information and receiving substantial gifts in return, from the placement of family members 
in Aiello’s companies, to cars and jewels, and to important political contacts, including with the 
Governor, Cuffaro. Ciuro was apparently so grateful to be ready to sacrifice ‘his own life’ for Aiello 
(PP1, p. 7). 
In the judicial investigation, the magistrate discovered that it was Riolo who had tipped off 
Brancaccio mafia boss Giuseppe Guttadauro about the listening devices he himself had installed in 
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his flat. Riolo had also enjoyed a long association with Cuffaro, for whom he had undertaken several 
sweeps to ascertain that Cuffaro’s home was not under police surveillance. Both Ciuro and Riolo 
had also informed Aiello about the progress of legal and police investigations into mafia leader 
Provenzano, and other Bagheria mafia families. It was the same Riolo who suggested that Aiello set 
up a secret mobile phone network in order to avoid police interception. However, despite careful 
precautions, this system worked for only a few months before the police discovered and intercepted 
it. Police interceptions revealed the group discussing the on-going private health fraud, as well as 
secret information regarding their investigations and those into mafia boss Provenzano (CPI2, p. 
211). The evidence gathered was used to establish a case in 2005, which led to the conviction of 
the defendants. The court of cassation confirmed the sentence of appeal in 2011: Michele Aiello was 
convicted of mafia association, corruption, and fraud, and sentenced to 15 years in prison; Salvatore 
Cuffaro was sentenced to seven years in prison for revealing investigative secrets; Riolo and Ciuro 
were sentenced to seven and four years respectively for corruption and for leaking investigative 
secrets. 
This illustration of the ‘grey zone’ reveals the existence of a broad and varied network of 
different actors who associate with Cosa Nostra on differing levels of complicity and collusion, 
requiring reciprocal recognition and mutual favours. As the prosecutors wrote, 
 
Rarely have we seen evidence of such relationships between a defendant accused of mafia association 
(Michele Aiello) and one convicted of the same crime (Giuseppe Guttadauro) with top echelon politicians, 
businessmen, professionals, with employees and directors of the public administration, with people who 
work in the prosecutors’ office and with members of the police force (PP1, p. 116). 
 
In line with existing scholarly approaches to the mafias’ grey zone (Sciarrone 2011, p. 41), 
this case demonstrates that the grey zone does not merely entail the idea of mafia parasitism of, and 
infiltration into the civil, political and economic sphere of society. Rather, it is emblematic of a more 
intricate system of relations and exchanges where the borders between traditionally separate areas 
of influence collapse and from which all players involved benefit. 
Since the 1980s, Cosa Nostra has been critically hit by the unprecedented level of exposure 
caused by the second mafia war and by the subsequent phenomenon of pentitismo (mafiosi turning 
state’s evidence). Unceasing police investigations and arrests of prominent mafiosi have also 
dismantled systematically every attempt of the mafia factions to reorganise a superordinate body, 
the so-called Commission. In spite of this, as our case study suggests, the Sicilian mafia is still active 
today. This is the evident result of mafia ability to transform adapting structure and modus operandi 
to changing circumstances. Furthermore, traditional and new sectors of the legal economy (e.g. 
health care system, construction business, retail distribution, renewable energies) have provided 
Cosa Nostra with larger opportunities for profit and diminished external visibility. This would not be 
possible without the extensive network of collusive and reciprocal relationship with key political and 
economic actors, which continues to facilitate mafia control of territory at a capillary level (CPI3, 
pp.18-25). 
 
 
Complicity: The Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta and holiday homes 
Our case study of the ‘Ndrangheta highlights a case of complicity of professionals including solicitors, 
local administrations, estate agents and bankers. Since the early 1990s, Calabrian clans, the so-
called ‘ndrine from the Gioia Tauro region, have become heavily involved in the trafficking of drugs 
from Colombia into Europe. As Forgione explains, ‘it is the Calabrians who now supply wholesale 
the Italian piazzas and half of those in Europe’ (2009, p. 5). However, these ‘ndrine are also very 
 9 
efficient businesses: Gratteri and Nicaso (2017) estimate they make 43 billion euros a year, of which 
at least 75 per cent is laundered back into the legal economy.  
One such ‘ndrine was extensively involved in the trafficking of drugs into Italy and around 
Europe (from Germany, Spain, Belgium, Holland). Members bought their drugs supplies from South 
American contacts living in these European countries, and would also hide their fugitives there to 
outsmart the police. One ‘ndrine member would even drive from Northern Italy into Switzerland to 
use a public pay phone, so that his telephone calls were not intercepted. This clan perpetually sought 
to launder the profits made from their drug trafficking operations. 
In the example we discuss here, this ndrina earmarked tourist villages and holiday flats 
located in Calabria as a destination for their dirty money. It is believed that they built 17 villages and 
1,343 holiday units using 12 companies, for a value of €450 million seized by the judiciary (Corriere 
della Calabria, 13/9/20138). This case confirms how the clan used extensive financial procedures for 
their money-laundering project, requiring the help of qualified professionals. 
This ‘ndrina with the help of friendly businessmen, solicitors, legal advisors, and engineers, 
was able to put into place an efficient financial system whereby companies sold seaside flats in 
Calabria to Spanish, British, Irish, and Italian holiday-makers. In other words, it was able to ‘clean‘ 
its money by selling flats to European tourists. The deals were defined as ‘joint ventures’ (TdRC1, p. 
872) between Calabrians and Spaniards, who together constructed tourist villages and ‘set up an 
articulated system of Italian and foreign companies in order to build in the tourist-residential sector’ 
(ibid). The ‘Ndrangheta was successful in this scam not only because of its contacts with Spanish 
businessmen, but also through the help of solicitors and legal advisors. 
The financial scheme was simple: various companies were established in order to channel 
money back to a company in Calabria, owned by two ‘ndrine. A legal firm based in Northern Europe 
acted as an intermediary, transferring money either directly to the Italian company or via Spanish 
companies. This firm prepared the paperwork, assisted their clients, and worked with a law firm in 
Calabria, which also drew up paperwork (sales agreements, terms of sale, etc.) in preparation for 
the sale of the flats. These two legal firms played a crucial role in this scam. Without them and their 
precise paperwork, the mafiosi would not have been able to sell their flats. 
While the legal firms facilitated procedures that non-specialists would not have been able to 
do, it would be inaccurate to consider them to be members of the clan. They were involved in the 
clan‘s activities as enablers who benefited from the transfers, rather than as insiders. Both firms 
showed characteristics of complicity and collusion, but not co-penetration. The Calabrian legal firm 
was aware of the scam and became an instrumental part of the operation, but did not seem to ask 
for anything substantial in return for its involvement. 
However, both firms did show signs of concern when the links between the holiday flats and 
organised crime became public knowledge. Indeed, they voiced concerns about being accused of 
‘external collusion with the mafia’. This shows a keen understanding of the situation. The well 
qualified advisor based in Northern Europe helped the clan by facilitating the payments of foreign 
clients. It seems as though this firm acted to benefit the clan rather than the clients, whose funds 
were not protected. 
This case study shows how ‘Ndrangheta cosche used a money recycling system to invest in 
the poorer parts of Calabria, using money defrauded from elsewhere; that defrauded money came 
thanks to the skill and intervention of well qualified solicitors. Moreover, although this investment 
could be considered to benefit local real estate and the tourism industry, many of these tourist 
villages were built illegally without building permits but with the complicity of local administrators. In 
this case, the damage is three-fold: (1) the complicity of solicitors and local administrators means 
that there is no longer a guaranteed level of morality among professionals; (2) the local real estate 
market is altered by the ‘Ndrangheta‘s massive financial investment, and (3) the environment is 
damaged by the illegal building of holiday flats. 
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Co-penetration: The Neapolitan Camorra9 and hospitals 
This case study specifically shows how professionals can become involved in criminal activities and 
develop a sense of belonging to the clan; they are co-penetrators. The so-called ‘Black Cross‘ 
investigation in 2015 highlights how many professionals have no moral or ethical standing and do 
not hesitate to become involved in criminal activities, if they can profit financially.  
Francesco Zagaria, alias Francuccio, was the brother-in-law of the Camorra boss Michele 
Zagaria, and the financial brains behind the criminal organisation (TdN1). The Zagaria clan was a 
part of the Iovine-Zagaria confederation, with which it shared part of its extortion money whilst 
retaining independence in its reinvestment projects and other business deals. A unique feature of 
the Zagaria clan was its control of companies in the Caserta region, especially in the building sector. 
The relationships between the Zagaria clan and the companies with which it worked were often 
highly collaborative, what Sciarrone defines as ‘collusion’: a permanent relationship of mutually 
beneficial business deals between clan and entrepreneur (2011). These relationships were often 
initiated by the companies themselves, as they sought an alliance with the clan when starting a 
project or trying to win a public contract in the Caserta region. In this way, the Zagaria clan was able 
to avoid the use of violence. Businesses turned to the clan in order to guarantee that they would 
work in peace and quiet, that no other criminal group would bother them, that they would have help 
to hamper possible internal union activity if necessary, and that they would be able to recuperate 
credit more easily. 
When married the boss’s sister, Francuccio became his right-hand man in the business world. 
He represented the clean face of the clan: he had no criminal records, he was an intelligent broker, 
and had connections with different politicians, directors, and administrators in the health sector and 
in the public regional water authority. Francuccio’s role was to seek out public contracts for 
companies close to the clan. A cooperative witness described his role as follows: 
 
When we speak of businessmen close to Michele Zagaria, we must immediately think of his brother-in-law, 
Francuccio Zagaria […] who, on Michele‘s behalf, was able to manage relations with the local public 
administrators [...] Thanks to Francuccio‘s abilities and his influential contacts, [...] Michele Zagaria was able 
to guarantee to businessmen from Casapesenna, many public contracts (TdN1, p. 82). 
 
In order to control the healthcare system, Francuccio visited Caserta hospital daily, as this 
was where he met with employees, businessmen, and local politicians. The only problem was that 
he had no real reason to be in the hospital, because he was neither a patient nor an external 
consultant. However, he behaved as though he was the managing director of the hospital. Indeed, 
many of the managers and officials of Caserta hospital were appointed thanks to him. As one of the 
most important managers of the Caserta health service divulged when interrogated by investigators: 
 
The management of the Caserta hospital was clearly in the hands of a certain Zagaria Francesco, who was 
related [...] to Zagaria Michele, the local boss on the run [....] In the health sector, it was common knowledge 
and absolutely taken for granted that Zagaria governed the hospital [...] If you knew Zagaria Francesco, you 
would have no problems, otherwise it would become very difficult to obtain anything whatsoever even if it 
was the law (TdN2, p. 43). 
 
          Francuccio’s relationship with local politicians enabled him to appoint hospital managers who 
favoured a network of companies directly connected to the Zagaria family. In this case, it emerged 
that all available public contracts and loans within a certain hospital department were won by 
companies nominated by him. According to the investigators, the total value of ‘dubious’ public 
contracts won by companies close to the clan during the period 2008-2013 amounted to 
approximately €60 million. The relationships between the Zagaria clan and businessmen were 
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simple. Through his political contacts, Francuccio gained public contracts for friendly companies, 
and in return these companies paid the clan a percentage of the value of the works. The businesses 
often employed people suggested by the politicians, while the politicians gained electoral support 
from the clan or from the clientele generated by the controlled contracts. 
He created a perfect illegal system in which each participant got what they wanted: a job, 
electoral support, a contract, a bribe, control of the territory. Every actor participating in this network 
of co-penetration accessed a ‘positive-sum game’ (Sciarrone 2011): they got their advantages, 
aware that the other participants would equally benefit from this relationship.  
In this way, state funds, collective interests, and individual and collective rights were stifled 
by a network of political-criminal interests. The manager of the engineering department of Caserta 
hospital was appointed in 2006 as a result of Francuccio’s political pressure. This department had a 
vital role in assigning contracts for the hospital. He wanted a trusted ally in that office, in order to 
bestow contracts on companies close to his brother’s clan. The manager became one of the most 
important mediators for the various interests of the clan, businesses, and politicians. Figure 1 
represents the relationships that existed between the different players in this illegal system of 
distribution of public contracts: 
 
Figure 1: Mafia infiltration of the hospital of Caserta10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the heart of this network were Francuccio, DD, his right-hand man, and FF, the director of 
the engineering department, whose names have been purposely anonymised. Francuccio‘s political 
contacts allowed the clan to influence the nomination of public administrators who favoured the clan’s 
projects. These public administrators accepted his suggestions regarding which companies to 
endorse, in order to progress in their own careers and to gain financially. Companies close to clan 
members won contracts and often contributed to the clan‘s common fund through voluntary 
“donations”. As we can see from this network of illegal relations (figure 1), on the left, the clan 
members who did not enter into direct contact with the politicians and managers who are on the right 
hand side. Instead, this contact is through Francuccio (and DD), who acted as mediators between 
the clan on one side, and public administrators, politicians, and managers on the other. Looking at 
the network of relations and its configuration in figure 1, it emerges that camorristi played a marginal 
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role by comparison with the other actors involved. Entrepreneurs and local politicians occupy a more 
prominent position within this network based on their ability to build relations across different and 
separate sectors: from public administration, social enterprises, citizens to camorra clans.  
Francuccio is a perfect illustration of the clan’s ‘grey zone’: he did not have a criminal record, 
and he had important relations with different local and regional politicians, while at the same time 
being the economic adviser to the boss, Michele Zagaria. Often, it was the businessmen and 
politicians who sought him out in order to win a contract or receive the protection of the clan. Yet his 
power not only derive from his family connection with Michele Zagaria. He was also a point of contact 
for the various public managers, politicians, and businessmen in case problems emerged in their 
‘illegal system of public contract distribution’ in relation to their respective roles and interests (TdN1, 
pp. 82-83). If one participant in the network did not keep their word, then Francuccio‘s diplomatic 
skills would have given way to the violence of the clan. In other words, Francuccio behaved in the 
interests of the clan and to all effects, behaved as a clan member, even though he was initially a 
clear outsider. He was longer separate from the organisation but belonged and identified with it in all 
he did. The clan gained financially but so did he.  
As is clear from this case study, every participant in this network gained what they desired, 
and it is the common good and the general interest that loose out. In the public health system of the 
Caserta region, the cost of services to society was higher than in other regions, while public services 
were less efficient. The benefits of the few (the camorristi and representatives of the ‘grey zone’) 
were to the detriment of public services and thus, a lowering of the quality of life for everyone. 
 
 
Concluding remarks: facilitators, what facilitators? 
In our article, we have chosen three case studies from Cosa Nostra, the ‘Ndrangheta and the 
Camorra to underline the varied nature of those who comprise the grey zone, how they interact with 
the mafias, and how they exploit each other. The grey zone that emerges from these different cases 
is a largely heterogeneous group of actors unified by one main goal: the acquisition of wealth and 
power. Mafiosi exploit this shared space, but they also belong to it, often in marginal roles compared 
to the external actors who dominate these criminal networks. 
Each case study has illustrated the main abilities of mafia groups: the capacity to develop 
relationships with various aspects of legal society in different sectors, and the capability to transform 
these relationships into an extensive range of mutually beneficial exchanges. In economic and social 
contexts where various forms of economic deviance already exist and where law enforcement 
agencies have difficulty intervening, mafiosi have the reputation, the power, and the relational means 
to undertake regulatory roles or to act in a predatory manner. The role of mafiosi is often very subtle; 
the boss or the foot soldiers become involved only if participants break the rules of behaviour that 
underpin the criminal collaboration. At the same time, the expertise of, or decisions made by actors 
external to the mafia are often crucial to their economic and political success. As already observed, 
and as the case studies in this article have highlighted, these external actors are vital to the mafias’ 
success in both legal and illegal activities, because they bring skills, knowledge, resources, 
expertise, and contacts that the mafias otherwise do not have (Ruggiero 2000). 
For example, our case study of the ‘Ndrangheta shows how mafia members did not have the 
necessary skills or experience to participate in the international real estate market. They needed 
precise legal and economic knowledge that their members did not possess. Yet the ‘Ndrangheta has 
a large amount of social capital, as well as the power to corrupt or intimidate external experts in a 
number of areas. Italian mafias join existing networks of economic and power interests, or create 
new ones with the aim of expanding their sphere of influence. These networks, composed by mafiosi 
and external actors appear to be very flexible. They lack the often neat hierarchy of the mafia clan. 
Instead, each participant plays a highly specialised role, and each earns his reward. This kind of 
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network is rarely structured over time, because it serves a specific and finite purpose. Once the 
principal goal is achieved, the network disbands and others develop with different actors and 
interests. This is the typical “shape” of the ‘grey zone’: a very flexible network composed of criminals 
and non-criminals, who use corruption as the principal tool to exchange and persuade. 
The cases of the Camorra clans and Cosa Nostra encapsulate the variety of possible 
relations between mafia organisations and the public sphere. The most privileged sector for mafia 
interests in Italy remains the public economy, particularly the healthcare service which facilitates the 
diversion of substantial public funds. It represents a symbolic crossroads between political and 
business interests on the one hand, and mafia interests on the other. The local organisation of public 
health services and its strong links with regional and local politicians can also help to explain why 
mafias are so interested in this strategic public sector. 
These cases show how, although mafiosi have social capital and the capacity to use violence, 
often the most crucial factor in making a successful investment or winning a subcontract is the 
professionalism of a lawyer, the decision of a judge or mayor, the calculations of an engineer or the 
information of a financial advisor, rather than the gun of a boss. Furthermore, it is only on rare 
occasions that mafia bosses use violence or intimidation to influence these external actors. Mafia 
organisations prefer relying on less-visible means, such as corruption, political exchange, and 
financial incentive. Without the existence of this ‘grey zone’, mafiosi would find it very difficult to 
venture out of their territory and beyond the use of violence.  
While the cases discussed in this article have focused chiefly on mafia groups in their territory 
of origin, this by no means excludes that similar dynamics can be observed in non-traditional mafia 
areas. Indeed, many recent studies have challenged the existing idea of mafia expansion as a direct 
cause for the existence of criminal activities and illegal practices in non-traditional mafia territories. 
Rather, it has been observed how a combination of both ‘contextual’ and ‘agency’ factors determines 
the interplay between mafiosi and local political and economic actors, highlighting the prominent role 
that the grey area has played in the process of mafias’ territorial expansion in central and northern 
Italy (Dalla Chiesa & Panzarasa 2012; Sciarrone 2014) and in Europe (Savona & Ricciardi 2015; 
Allum 2016).   
In light of evidence hitherto discussed, the question is not whether or not mafias establish 
relationships with society; this is a given. The problem is rather to grasp the exact dynamics through 
which mafia groups build these relations within the ever-evolving circumstances of a changing 
society. Indeed, throughout their history Italian mafias have demonstrated that they are not closed, 
autocratic, or impervious to external conditions, but rather organisations that respond to changes in 
their internal and external environment. For this reason, the concept of a ‘grey zone‘ risks becoming 
a vague analytical tool if it is not combined with concrete empirical studies that illustrate the specific 
modalities and mechanisms that connect mafia organisations with the wider society. It would 
therefore be very helpful to understand the importance of conceptualising the grey-zone not merely 
in terms of specific economic and financial skills but as a large, extensive and flexible group of people 
with multiple skills and contacts. Helpers, sponsors, enablers and facilitators can belong to any 
profession that can prove useful to mafiosi in their different projects, whether this be money 
laundering, travel, legal or healthcare. These helpers are vital to the mafias’ integration into society 
and to normalise (and uncriminalise) their presence and activities within and outside Italy.  
The conclusion of this research may be useful for civil society, law enforcement agencies, 
and politicians, who need to pay more attention to the nature of the relationships between mafias 
and wider society, divided by a barrier of morality that is becoming more and more subtle. This is the 
case not only in the South of Italy, and not only in Italy.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 The research for this article, including the data discussed in the three case studies, were initially presented 
at the symposium on ‘Change, Resistance, and Collective Action in Southern Italy‘, University of Kent, 
4/9/2015. 
2 It is important to draw attention to the fact that, in view of the serious allegations (including guilty verdicts in 
assize and appeal courts) referred to in the text, all persons are to be considered innocent until a final verdict 
of guilty is pronounced. In addition, no complicity with the Camorra or criminal activity should be inferred from 
any similarity of name of an individual, public place or organisation with which a person is associated, unless 
there are specific statements to the contrary. In some cases, names have been disguised by the use of initials 
to render the identities of those concerned anonymous. 
3 According to state witness Antonino Giuffrè, Guttadauro represented Provenzano’s perfect ally in his aim to 
remodel the image of Cosa Nostra by re-establishing its networks with economic and political actors. See TTI1 
4 Both investigations emerged in the early 2000s from the Operation ‘Ghiaccio 1’, which centred on the 
role of surgeon Guttadauro in relation to the Brancaccio mafia clan. 
5 For a more detailed account of mafia interests and network of collusion around the Santa Teresa Clinic, see 
Daniela Minerva 2009; Scaglione et al. 2011, pp.141-142; Dino and Macaluso 2016.  
6 A report signed by the Colonel of the Carabinieri Angiolo Pellegrini detailed, as early as 1984, the outlines of 
what investigators have defined as the ‘Provenzano Holding’: a series of companies (Scientisud, Medisud, 
Polilab, Biotecnica) that specialised in supplying hospitals and private medical services with electronic devices 
and equipment. See Ldc. 
7 While the connection between Aiello and the mafia faction of Bagheria under Provenzano’s leadership has 
been ascertained judicially, there was never enough evidence to prove the mafia funding of his business in the 
private health sector and corroborate Giuffre’s revelations in this regard. 
8 ‘La joint-venture di ndrine e uomini d`affari’ http://www.corrieredellacalabria.it/index.php/cronaca/item/16758-
17536_la_joint-venture_di_ndrine_e_uomini_daffari/1675 (accessed 11/1/16). 
9  The Caserta mafia is a criminal confederation based in the province of Caserta, in the Campania region. It 
is known as the Casalesi clan, named after the city of origin of Schiavone and Bidognetti, the clan’s two most 
influential leaders. The Caserta clan has many features that characterise the Sicilian mafia Cosa Nostra. In 
addition to Caserta, the clan is also active in the rest of Italy, in Spain, Germany, and the US. Since the 1980s, 
the Caserta mafia is considered one of the most important and influential criminal organisations in Europe. 
10 Recreation of events based on evidence (see TdN1) using the software Netdraw (Borgatti, Everett & 
Freeman, 2002). 
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